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Community Benefits Agreements 
A SYMPTOM, NOT THE ANTIDOTE, 
OF BILATERAL LAND USE REGULATION∗ 
Alejandro E. Camacho† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Lorenzo is an upscale, Italian-themed apartment 
and retail complex near the University of Southern California.1 
Primarily marketed to USC students and young professionals, 
the Lorenzo lures prospective tenants with its indoor 
basketball courts, stadium-seating movie theater, three-story 
fitness center, climbing wall, and on-site café.2 However, what 
visitors will not see in this $250 million apartment complex is 
that the on-site community medical clinic will operate rent-free 
for the next twenty years.3 Also missing from the list of 
amenities are the funds that the developer earmarked for job 
training, local construction workers, and nearby small 
businesses, as well as the low-income-housing community trust 
created during the land use negotiation process.4 These unseen 
features are part of the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) 
negotiated between a South Los Angeles community coalition—
United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement 
                                                
 ∗ © 2013 Alejandro E. Camacho. All Rights Reserved. 
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Resources, University of California, Irvine School of Law; Member Scholar, Center for 
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 1 Patrick J. McDonnell, City Planners Approve $250-million Residential-
Retail Complex in South L.A., L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/feb/11/local/la-me-lorenzo-development-20110211. 
 2 LORENZO, http://www.thelorenzo.com/amenities (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 3 Diana Pei Wu, Los Angeles Coalition Wins Health Clinic and Jobs from 
Developer, 18 RACE, POVERTY, & ENV’T 38, 38-41 (2011). 
 4 Id. 
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(UNIDAD)—and the Lorenzo’s developer, Geoffrey Palmer.5 
This agreement accomplished many things: affected community 
members were able to participate in the development’s 
planning; the developer was able to build community support 
for the project and avoid costly litigation; and the municipality 
was able to tailor land use development to better accommodate 
the interests of all stakeholders.6 
CBAs have proliferated as part of a larger movement 
throughout the United States away from the unilateral, 
government-dominated model of land use regulation and 
toward a more negotiated paradigm.7 This now-predominant 
model of negotiated decision making, however, has primarily 
been bilateral, allowing extensive and unparalleled 
opportunities for developers to engage in negotiation with 
government regulators but limiting participation opportunities 
for other affected parties, such as local residents and small 
businesses. In contrast to this prevailing bilateral model, CBAs 
allow a wide array of interested parties to participate in the 
decision-making process.8 Some developers and municipalities 
have recognized that utilizing CBAs can avert or mitigate the 
negative effects development will have on a community, reduce 
conflict, promote civic engagement, and create community buy-
in and goodwill toward a new project.9 
Although CBAs have emerged in part to address issues 
found in the bilateral, negotiated-development model, 
unfortunately they have been accompanied by significant 
problems of their own.10 Most notably, concerns such as whether 
to engage in a CBA process, the appropriate framework for its 
negotiation, and its relationship to the public regulatory-
approval process are typically left to the discretion of the 
developer. As a result, such agreements typically develop in 
parallel to the public process but independently of it—a 
redundancy that leads to additional costs for both developers and 
community members. More importantly, the negotiation process 
                                                
 5 Id.; Annie Lainer Marquit, Commentary, Public Counsel: Community 
Development Lawyers Building Foundations for Healthy Communities, 21 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 9, 15 (2012). 
 6 Pei Wu, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
 7 See infra Part I. 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 21-22 (2005), available at 
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/publications/community-benefits-agreements- 
making-development-projects-accountable.  
 10 See id. at 22-23. 
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results in less-than-optimal agreements that disproportionately 
reflect the interests of the developer, since it is entirely up to the 
developer how much to involve other stakeholders. 
These weaknesses of CBAs, however, reflect the 
continued inadequacy of the existing bilateral-negotiation 
process in providing for legitimate land use decisions. The 
existing bilateral paradigm could be improved by altering the 
public regulatory process to require integration of more 
meaningful and sustained stakeholder participation 
opportunities—akin to those provided by CBAs—thereby 
reorienting the governmental authority to serve as mediator 
rather than negotiator of land use conflict. These improvements 
could allow states to stimulate democratic participation, 
minimize the costs that accompany separate public and private 
negotiations, and promote land use decisions that better reflect 
the interests of all affected parties. Such a multilateral model 
would help produce decisions that are better planned and more 
efficient, fair, and democratic. 
This essay proceeds in three sections. Part I outlines the 
modern public land use decision-making process’s transition 
from a unilateral model to bilateral-negotiation model, while 
Part II discusses the rise of CBAs as a response to 
shortcomings of the bilateral process. Part II also analyzes 
CBAs’ benefits and drawbacks, and Part III suggests how 
elements of the CBA process can be integrated into a more 
effective negotiating model. In particular, rather than 
encouraging the creation of CBAs in the land use negotiation 
process, local governments should seek to integrate the most 
successful elements of the CBA process into the existing 
bilateral-negotiation framework, creating a multilateral, 
community-oriented decision-making process.  
I. EVOLUTION TOWARD NEGOTIATED PUBLIC LAND USE 
REGULATION 
Public land use regulation in the United States was 
initially premised on a unilateral, “command-and-control” 
model of regulation, akin to the classic “New Deal” model of 
administrative regulatory authority that bases its legitimacy 
on regulator expertise.11 This model viewed local planning 
                                                
 11 Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440-41, 446 (2003) (describing New Deal model of regulatory 
management by experts “[g]uided by experience and professional discipline”). 
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agencies as experts charged with developing the land use rules 
and decisions for their jurisdiction.12 Zoning regulations were 
expected to be detailed, prospective, and generally applicable 
rules that regulators with limited public involvement 
established and local expert planners and planning 
commissions administered.13 Changes to or deviations from 
these general rules were expected to be rare. 
Unsurprisingly, it quickly became clear that this model 
failed to produce enduring land use rules and led to the rise of 
various negotiation-based approaches. Two key problems with 
this unilateral model were its reliance on planning expertise 
purportedly capable of conceiving objective rules, as well as an 
assumption of comprehensive rationality despite substantial 
uncertainty.14 In practice, land was frequently designated for 
uses that were not deemed economically desirable or feasible, 
and land use rules were often used to exclude and discriminate 
against persons viewed as undesirable.15 
Criticisms of this normative model soon gave rise to 
widespread reliance on a suite of bilateral, negotiation-based 
approaches. The two most basic variations of this bilateral-
negotiation model are negotiated zoning and development and 
annexation agreements. Negotiated zoning remains closely tied 
to the traditional unilateral approach of land use regulation. 
This model accepts the existing command-and-control land use 
plan, but it also employs a number of flexibility devices that 
allow piecemeal exceptions to existing zoning regulations, 
including conditional use permits, variances, planned unit 
developments, and contract zoning.16 Under this model, a 
developer negotiates with the local government for changes to 
the property’s zoning designation, keeping in mind that takings 
law requires negotiated conditions to be limited to reducing 
impacts caused by zoning changes.17 Consequently, while this 
model allows some deviation from the existing zoning 
                                                
 12 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive 
Planning in Land Use Decisions (Installment I), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9 (2005) 
[hereinafter Camacho, Mustering I]. 
 13 Id. at 8. 
 14 Id. at 13-15. 
 15 See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 6, 
15 (1961). 
 16 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 39. 
 17 See 2 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.20, at 171 (Kenneth H. 
Young ed., 4th ed. 1996); see also infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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framework, its negotiation process and permissible revisions 
are somewhat limited.18 
Development agreements and annexation agreements, 
on the other hand, permit more negotiation and greater 
deviation from existing land use designations.19 Once a state passes 
enabling legislation that authorizes such agreements—over sixteen 
states have done this to date—cities are free to adopt development 
agreements or annexation agreements as amendments to traditional 
zoning regulations.20 Development agreements are express contracts 
in which a developer, before beginning a project, seeks a long-term 
change or freeze of rules applicable to the property in question.21 In 
California, virtually all large-scale developments are pursued through 
development agreements.22 
Legislation authorizing development agreements and 
annexation agreements typically allows for wholesale exceptions 
to existing land use codes, and the few courts who have 
considered the issue agree that projects undertaken through 
such agreements are not subject to Takings Clause limitations.23 
Indeed, because development agreements and annexation 
agreements are characterized as voluntary contracts, they allow 
cities unprecedented flexibility to accommodate developers. In 
exchange, developers may provide contributions to cities, which 
are typically placed into a general fund or earmarked for 
unrelated pet projects.24 This framework allows the developer to 
                                                
 18 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 16-21. 
 19 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Michael H. Zischke, Development Agreements: 
Securing Vested Rights and Project Completion Benefits, in 1989 ZONING AND PLANNING 
LAW HANDBOOK 349, 360 (Mark S. Dennison ed., 1989). 
 20 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING 
LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 154A.02, at 145 (Supp. 2002). 
 21 David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land 
Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for 
Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 664 (2001). 
 22 See DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATION WON’T 
WORK 46, 53 (1994) (noting that hundreds of communities in California have used 
development agreements). 
 23 See, e.g., Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 
698-99 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding nexus requirement does not apply in settlement 
agreement between agency and developer “because the promise is entered into 
voluntarily, in good faith and is supported by consideration”); Xenia Rural Water Ass’n 
v. Dallas Cnty., 445 N.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Iowa 1989) (holding negotiated setback 
requirement not a taking where part of agreement between parties); Meredith v. Talbot 
Cnty., 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (stating that agreement between 
developer and county in which developer agreed to convey property to conservation 
group in exchange for approval was not a taking because the agreement was an 
“informed business decision” benefiting the developer and thus voluntary, even if “the 
decision was made in the face of likely adverse governmental action”). 
 24 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 30-33. 
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negotiate with the city for those changes but, as with 
negotiated zoning, public input is at best indirect.25 As a result, 
adjacent residents and local businesses bear most of the burden 
but may receive none of the benefits.26 
The bilateral-negotiation model—whether through more 
conventional, negotiated zoning or the more recent, 
development-agreement variation—is now the baseline process 
for land use regulation in virtually every state in the United 
States.27 Although negotiated zoning and development 
agreements promote more negotiation and flexibility than the 
traditional, unilateral command-and-control model, certain 
characteristics of this paradigm shift have undermined its 
legitimacy. Chief among these criticisms is that the 
negotiation, implementation, and monitoring processes are 
exclusionary.28 Because both negotiated zoning and 
development agreements typically involve only the developer 
and the local government, affected community groups are 
necessarily left out of the equation.29 Additionally, these 
arrangements can lead to inefficient agreements that fail to 
reflect the full range of interests affected by the land use 
conflict.30 It also places the local government planner in the 
unworkable position of negotiating on behalf of many 
competing interests with little input from the parties who will 
be affected.31 Because of this bilateral orientation, the 
negotiation process and subsequent approval process are also 
criticized for promoting conflict and ignoring the long-term 
community engagement that is essential to the legitimacy of 
decentralized decision-making processes.32 Finally, although 
this agreement-by-agreement approach is ad hoc by nature, it 
simultaneously fails to adapt to change. In particular, it fails to 
provide mechanisms that ensure continued monitoring and 
                                                
 25 See id. at 23-30. 
 26 Id. at 33, 39-40. 
 27 See, e.g., Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning 
Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 166-67 (1989); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains 
and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2000); Carol 
M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 849 (1983); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: 
The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 347-48 (2002). 
 28 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 39. 
 29 CALLIES, supra note 22, at 53. 
 30 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 15. 
 31 Id. at 40.  
 32 Id. at 65.  
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adjustment of decisions in order to account for changed 
circumstances or new information.33  
II. CBAS AS A RESPONSE TO THE BILATERAL MODEL 
CBAs emerged as a tool to help resolve land use conflict 
largely in response to the lack of transparency and stakeholder 
representation in public land use decisions. In contrast to 
development agreements—to which the developer and the 
governmental authority are the only parties—CBAs are usually 
negotiated directly between the project developer and 
community representatives.34 Rather than containing terms 
between a developer and the local government, CBAs specify 
public benefits that a developer will provide in order to secure 
community support for (or at least tolerance of) the proposed 
project.35 Typically, local groups relinquish the right to 
challenge project approvals and sometimes agree to provide 
affirmative support in exchange for the developer’s agreement 
to provide community benefits.36  
CBAs range in shape and size. Some are small 
agreements between one or more local groups, while others are 
essentially city-wide contracts that involve many community 
stakeholders and provide wide-ranging community benefits. 
Examples of the community benefits these agreements secure 
include funding for affordable housing, parking, park space, 
living wages, and local hiring.37 Most CBAs—such as the 
Ballpark Village CBA in San Diego, the Atlantic Yards CBA in 
Brooklyn, and the Los Angeles International Airport and 
Staples Center CBAs in Los Angeles—are private agreements, 
signed between community groups and the developer directly.38 
Even privately negotiated CBAs, however, will often include 
governmental involvement at some stage.39 In some cases, 
private CBAs have been incorporated into the public regulatory 
                                                
 33 Id. at 50. 
 34 See Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government 
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 5 (2010). 
 35 See Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Legal and Policy Issues Related to 
Community Benefits Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 557 (2010). 
 36 Benjamin S. Beach, Strategies and Lessons from the Los Angeles Community 
Benefits Experience, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 77, 105 (2008). 
 37 Id. at 98. 
 38 See Been, supra note 34, at 7. 
 39 Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits 
Agreements, 24 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., no. 4, July 2008, at 20 [hereinafter Salkin & 
Lavine, Understanding I]. 
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process through development agreements, while other “public” 
CBAs were negotiated directly between the governmental 
authority and the developer, enabling government involvement 
in the agreement’s implementation and enforcement.40 
Examples of this latter type of agreement include the 
Cherokee-Gates Rubber CBA in Denver, agreements related to 
the Yale Cancer Center in New Haven, and the Oak-to-Ninth 
project in Oakland.41 Still other public CBAs involved a 
governmental entity as the developer, such as the CBA 
negotiated by the Los Angeles World Airport Authority.42 
Nonetheless, some assert that any agreements that involve 
governmental authorities are not CBAs but rather public–
private partnerships.43  
In some sense, CBAs can be understood as an extension 
of more conventional forms of private ordering in the land use 
context, similar to real covenants and easements in that they 
allow the developer and other stakeholders to negotiate land 
use restrictions. Indeed, CBAs are most similar to conventional 
servitudes in that they involve a set of promises that are 
intended to burden the use of—and to run with—particular 
land.44 Of course, many CBAs differ from private land use 
controls in that they require local government involvement at 
some stage.45 Additionally, even purely private CBAs do not 
involve a transfer of a real property interest. Indeed, their 
affirmative promises typically are not intended to benefit any 
                                                
 40 Id. 
 41 Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and 
Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY. DEV. L. 35, 37, 47 
(2008) (describing how community organizations sometimes use the term to describe 
any outcome resulting in campaigned-for community benefits, while local government 
officials and developers sometimes use CBAs to describe any set of community benefits 
commitments to which they agree). 
 42 Id. at 51. 
 43 But see David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for 
Investment in America’s Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 660-61 (2007) (making a clear 
distinction between CBAs, which he defines as having no government involvement, and 
development agreements, which he calls “Public-Private Partnerships”). 
 44 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1) (2000) (defining 
servitude as “a legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land or 
an interest in land”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 224-25 (3d ed. 2010) (“Land 
use restrictions intended to run with the land are called ‘covenants’ or ‘servitudes.’”). 
 45 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Cf. Terry Pristin, In Major 
Projects, Agreeing not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C6 (characterizing 
New York City’s CBA process that excludes local government officials as atypical of 
most CBA processes). 
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particular real property interest.46 CBAs thus routinely include 
as parties community stakeholders who may or may not be 
landowners. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of private 
CBAs in contrast to servitudes is the fact that the 
consideration stakeholders often provide for any community 
benefits is a return promise to support or at least acquiesce in 
the development.47 
A. The Virtues of the CBA Trend 
The increased use of CBAs has provided several benefits 
to the now-prevalent bilateral-negotiation model of land use 
regulation. Some commenters have argued that the negotiated 
outcomes are more effective, efficient, fair, and legitimate as a 
result of CBAs.48 CBAs enable community stakeholders to 
negotiate the mitigation of development impacts that adversely 
affect surrounding neighborhoods. These effects on the 
surrounding community can include severe environmental 
concerns, economic concerns, or strain on local facilities or 
resources.49 In the case of the UNIDAD CBA in South Los 
Angeles, where the property owner had demolished one of the 
few medical facilities in the community to make way for 
upscale apartments, the community coalition was able to 
negotiate for a medical clinic as well as money for a land trust 
to support low-income housing in a new development.50 CBAs 
can thus ensure that developers and local governments do not 
overlook these community impacts when planning or approving 
development projects.51  
                                                
 46 See GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 10 (outlining common community 
benefits negotiated for, including living wage requirements, local hiring, space for 
community centers or clinics, parks or green spaces, and affordable housing). 
 47 Beach, supra note 36, at 97. 
 48 See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 21-22 (“The CBA negotiation 
process provides a mechanism to ensure that community concerns are heard and 
addressed . . . . CBAs commit developers in writing to promises they make regarding 
their projects, and make enforcement much easier . . . . CBAs encourage early 
negotiation between developers and the community, avoiding delays in the approval 
process.”). Cf. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 624-25 (2011) (asserting negotiated development can serve to 
promote economic efficiency). 
 49 Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 545.  
 50 Pei Wu, supra note 3, at 38-41 (describing the CBA process and outcome 
between UNIDAD and developer). 
 51 Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits 
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for 
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 291, 295-96 (2008) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II] (“CBAs are 
considered by their supporters to be powerful tools for assuring that community 
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To the extent that these agreements integrate the full 
range of interests of affected parties, CBAs have the potential 
to promote and perhaps best approximate the broader public 
interest.52 Such an assertion mirrors claims raised on behalf of 
other multilateral or collaborative regulatory processes.53 
Various commenters have reported community participants’ 
substantial satisfaction with the outcome of CBAs,54 including 
the development of long-term collaboration among community 
members as a result of CBAs.55 In addition to mitigating the 
negative effects from development, community groups can also 
secure extra amenities that otherwise would be unobtainable, 
either because they are not traditionally addressed in the 
normal planning process56 or because of local government 
budget constraints.57 Of course, the very existence of the CBA 
itself is evidence that every party believed it was better off with 
an agreement than without one. 
In addition to improving substantive outcomes, there is 
a credible argument that CBAs may improve land use decision-
  
 
impacts will not be overlooked when large developments are planned for the 
neighborhood”); see also Been, supra note 34, at 15 (“CBAs may give neighborhoods a 
more meaningful role in the development process than the opportunities the existing 
land use process provides for public participation.”). 
 52 See GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 16 (discussing the wide array of 
community interests included in the LAX CBA in Los Angeles, such as labor unions, 
environmentalists, church congregations, educators, administrators, and minority 
interest groups). 
 53 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study 
in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 309-10 (2007) (describing how 
advocates of collaborative habitat conservation planning argued that collaborative 
regulation would serve to better approximate the public interest by integrating 
stakeholders early and throughout agreement formation and implementation). 
 54 See, e.g., Pei Wu, supra note 3, at 41 (“[M]ost are extremely excited at the 
prospect of a new community health center, small business spaces, new jobs at living 
wages, and other benefits to be implemented at the new development. The hope is that 
this can become an anchor for community well-being, instead of something that 
contributes to community displacement.”). 
 55 See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 32 (“[O]rganizers note that 
organizations that learned to work together through the Staples negotiations have 
continued collaborating with regard to other projects. In this respect, success has bred 
success; the coalition-building aspect of the CBA process has indeed led to lasting 
collaboration, resulting in greater political effectiveness for participants.”). 
 56 See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 14 (discussing the “unprecedented” 
features of the Staples CBA in Los Angeles, including “a developer-funded assessment 
of community park [and] recreation needs, . . . a goal that 70% of the jobs created in the 
project will pay the City’s living wage, . . . consultation with the coalition on selection of 
tenants[,] . . . increased affordable housing requirements in the housing component of 
the project, and a commitment of seed money for other affordable housing 
projects . . . .”); Been, supra note 34, at 17 (noting negotiations for wage rates or 
employment practices). 
 57 Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 544.  
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making processes. Some evidence shows that community 
members believe CBAs can lead to a more effective, fair, and 
legitimate decision-making process.58 In contrast with the more 
common adversarial approach that usually generates litigation, 
many prefer the CBA process because it provides an opportunity 
for more creative and cooperative problem solving.59 Moreover, 
because CBAs can increase community participation in land use 
decisions, they arguably have intrinsic democratic value beyond 
mere participant satisfaction.60 CBAs grant communities, 
including low-income and minority groups, a voice in the 
development process, empowering them with a degree of control 
where corporate interests usually dominate.61 As such, CBAs 
offer community groups the opportunity for procedural justice by 
enabling them to participate directly in decision making. Such 
direct stakeholder participation has been shown to increase the 
perceived legitimacy of public decision-making processes like 
CBAs,62 independent of the ultimate substantive outcome.63 
Satisfaction with the CBA process is not limited to the 
community groups who negotiate them. Developers also benefit 
from its procedural advantages by obtaining less expensive 
conflict resolution, generating community goodwill and support 
(which can help secure regulatory approval), and fostering 
long-term development viability through investment in the 
surrounding community.64 While vocal community opposition 
                                                
 58 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 1; Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant: 
Community Benefit Agreements and Urban Development, 44 URB. LAW. 827, 842 (2013) 
(stating surveyed community stakeholders believed CBAs improved the development 
process); Mitch Thompson, Harrison Residents Grasp CBA as a Tool Towards Racial and 
Economic Equity, in COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: GROWING A MOVEMENT IN 
MINNESOTA 6-8 (2008), available at http://www.metrostability.org/ 
efiles/CBAREPORT.pdf. 
 59 See Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 544-45. 
 60 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 27 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman I]. 
 61 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 299; see also GROSS 
ET AL., supra note 9, at 35. 
 62 Nathan Markey, Atlantic Yards Community Benefit Agreement: A Case Study of 
Organizing Community Support for Development, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 380 (2009). 
 63 See Kirk Emerson et al., The Challenges of Environmental Conflict 
Resolution, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 3, 8 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003); Jody Freeman, 
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1311 
n.104 (2003) (citing empirical evidence that the public values due process and that fair 
and inclusive procedures may increase future compliance and perceptions of 
legitimacy); see also generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
 64 See, e.g., Been, supra note 34, at 18 (“Some developers . . . have accepted 
and even embraced the use of CBAs because they may secure some measure of 
community support for, or at least reduce opposition to, the development. Even if the 
developer believes the project will be approved without a CBA, by gaining support (or 
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can stall projects for years in litigation and severely delay 
development, CBAs allow developers to address the 
community’s concerns up front.65 CBAs can thus “provide 
certainty to a developer that its project can be constructed on” 
schedule without the risk of litigation delay.66 In addition, 
public support can help “facilitate[] [a] project’s passage 
through the city’s municipal and regulatory channels,”67 
enabling developers to more easily obtain government approval 
or subsidies68 for their projects.69 Particularly when projects will 
require city infrastructure investments or public financing, 
community support can be invaluable to developers. Finally, it 
is worth noting that negotiated benefits that go to area 
residents may ultimately have lasting positive benefits for the 
eventual development project as well. Some assert that the 
developer’s agreement to give priority to local workers during 
construction of the airport in the Los Angeles World Airport 
CBA, for example, may have positively affected the project’s 
ultimate profitability.70 Similarly, such negotiations likely 
provide developers valuable insights about local market 
interest in their development and potential alterations that 
might improve such marketability. 
Municipalities may play a neutral role in private CBAs, 
like in the Lorenzo Project agreement, but they also stand to 
benefit from the decreased political and legal pressure that 
emerges from negotiated agreements between developers and 
community groups.71 Successful negotiations could mean that a 
  
 
reducing opposition) for the project in the community, a CBA may reduce the risk of 
rejection or save the developer time in the approval process.”); Salkin & Lavine, 
Understanding II, supra note 51, at 293-94 (explaining value of community support to 
developers). But see Selmi, supra note 48, at 642 (asserting that CBA use has not been 
widespread, “in part because developers have little incentive to enter into them”). 
 65 Been, supra note 34, at 19 (“A CBA will reduce the chances of a lawsuit being 
filed; the more inclusive the CBA is, the more certainty a developer will have that a 
project will proceed on a timely basis.”); Steven P. Frank, Note, Yes In My Backyard: 
Developers, Government, and Communities Working Together Through Development 
Agreements and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 227, 247 (2009). 
 66 Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 544. 
 67 Naved Sheikh, Note, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private Contracts 
Replace Public Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 242 (2008).  
 68 Been, supra note 34, at 7 (“Community opposition also may affect whether 
government agencies are willing to help fund the project.”). 
 69 Marcello, supra note 43, at 658. 
 70 As one commentator observed, “[t]hese additional dollars ‘roll over’ several 
times in the local economy, generating multiple waves of economic development. Many 
dollars go to existing small businesses whose customer base may be eroded by new 
large-scale developments.” Id. at 668. 
 71 Been, supra note 34, at 20. 
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local government will spend fewer of its resources defending 
environmental or land use decisions.72 In addition, a broad 
number of disparate concerns may be addressed through CBAs 
without a government spending its political capital to address 
them.73 Perhaps most importantly, CBAs also enable 
municipalities to be creative in devising solutions to conflicts 
and provide more flexibility than conventional negotiated-
zoning processes.74 
Finally, an important but underappreciated procedural 
benefit of CBAs is that they accomplish the important goal of 
memorializing the relationships among community members. 
CBAs embody the recognition and explicit establishment of a 
long-term relationship between stakeholders. In this sense, 
CBAs can foster community building, and when combined with 
a development agreement, they can be a vehicle to promote 
both flexibility and certainty in the regulatory process.75 Like 
development agreements, CBAs can be useful tools for 
adaptively managing uncertainty through contingency 
planning: they can anticipate where there are uncertainties 
and incorporate processes into the agreement that account for 
known contingencies and the possibility of new information or 
changed circumstances.76 Yet development agreements can also 
provide certainty to a developer by delivering clear assurances 
in the form of vested rights, allowing the developer to proceed 
without fear that the city will change midstream the rules 
applicable to the property.77  
B. Claimed Shortcomings of CBAs 
Though many have extolled the virtues of CBAs, other 
commenters have raised numerous concerns about their 
increased use. Some critiques have focused on procedural 
                                                
 72 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 296. 
 73 Been, supra note 34, at 20 (“CBAs may allow elected and appointed 
officials to distance themselves from politically unpopular community demands or from 
politically unpopular developments.”). 
 74 Id. at 19 (stating “CBAs may allow municipalities to bypass legal 
constraints on land use regulation imposed by statute and judicial precedent”). 
 75 Gross, supra note 41, at 47. 
 76 Cf. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive 
Planning in Land Use Decisions (Installment II), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 296-300 
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering II] (discussing the potential of development 
agreements and other land use agreements for managing uncertainty and promoting 
adaptive land use planning). 
 77 Id. at 299. 
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concerns, including a lack of transparency and increased costs, 
concerns regarding the transfer of public authority to private 
parties, and a range of concerns focused on the adequate 
representation of stakeholders. In addition, some commenters 
have focused on uncertainties pertaining to the legal 
constraints on CBAs. As detailed below,78 however, these 
critiques are based on antiquated notions of the private role in 
public governance and are more appropriately aimed at the 
prevailing bilateral model of public land use controls that CBAs 
arose to try, in part, to address. 
One critique of the CBA process is that it mingles or 
even conflates public and private interests. The CBA 
negotiation process’s integration of private interests into the 
public decision-making process may be seen as muddying and 
privatizing public land use regulation.79 For example, some 
critics argue that, because public authorities have an obligation 
to provide public services and benefits such as funding for 
parks and affordable housing, municipalities and community 
groups should not rely on private negotiation with developers 
to assist in providing them.80 In this vision of a strict public–
private dichotomy, determinations of the public interest 
become tainted when CBAs are incorporated into the zoning-
approval process because CBAs involve private parties 
advancing their private interests.81 For at least some of these 
commenters, a more streamlined and insulated public decision-
making process, primarily directed and informed by 
                                                
 78 See infra Part IV. 
 79 See Musil, supra note 58, at 850-51 (stating how CBAs fit into the public 
regulatory process is unknown and that CBAs raise conceptual confusion and 
controversy). Cf. Selmi, supra note 48, at 633 (discussing the inherent public interest in 
a planning process that “reflects the public interest rather than arbitrarily favoring 
private or political interests”); id. at 615 (bargaining between a government and a 
developer takes away some of the inherent fairness, neutrality, and legitimacy that 
accompanies a purely public regulatory model because bargaining indicates that 
parties are biased toward their own positions, but also signals that the government is 
willing to give up certain public benefits in the process).  
 80 See, e.g., Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 551 (“Initially, one could 
question whether it is fair that communities need to bargain with private actors for 
community resources that governments arguably have an obligation to provide, such as 
affordable housing, parks, and adequate funding for schools.”); Sheikh, supra note 67, 
at 243 (critiquing the use of CBAs as a tool for governments to negotiate concessions 
from developers to finance a city’s unmet infrastructural needs). 
 81 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 41, at 38 (commenting that private CBAs, 
without government guidance or involvement, are prone to community groups without 
any interest in the project using CBAs to extort benefits); Musil, supra note 58, at 840 
(noting concerns with some private CBAs as having a distorting effect on the public 
regulatory process). 
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knowledgeable bureaucrats, would presumably produce better, 
timelier, and more legitimate results.82  
Similarly, some critics worry that the continued reliance 
on CBAs will produce an increasingly opaque decision-making 
process. Indeed, it is true that, as with other negotiated 
agreements, CBA negotiations are not required to be 
transparent or public.83 Furthermore, although negotiations in 
the conventional, public land use decision-making process may 
also be inaccessible,84 the opacity in CBA negotiations is even 
more pronounced, given that the public process at least 
requires a minimal public hearing.85 This lack of transparency 
has prompted concerns regarding the potential for unfair 
dealing through the CBA negotiation process86 and the parallel 
public decision-making process.87 For example, some have 
argued that the developer for the Atlantic Yards CBA in 
Brooklyn manipulated the CBA process to generate an 
appearance of public support to improve the project’s chances of 
approval, “yielding just enough concessions to targeted 
segments of a community to manufacture a semblance of public 
support and earn the needed permits and approvals from 
government entities.”88 
Other commentators focus on the increased burdens 
CBAs place on developers, using the prevailing public bilateral 
process with limited public participation as a baseline of 
comparison. For example, some commentators raise concerns 
regarding the potential that governments will place pressure on 
developers to engage in CBAs.89 Others have identified the 
                                                
 82 Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in 
Siting Wind Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 330-31 (2011). 
 83 Cf. Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 552 (discussing how transparency is 
essential but not required for CBAs).  
 84 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 36-42 (detailing the regularly 
perfunctory and imbalanced public participation in bilateral public land use regulation). 
 85 Selmi, supra note 48, at 643. 
 86 See, e.g., Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 552 (stating CBAs might be 
unfair to taxpayers because public funds in the form of favorable tax breaks might be 
directed to only one area of the community through a benefits package). 
 87 Sheikh, supra note 67, at 231, 242; cf. LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL 
WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 362 (1984) (arguing that by 
“encouraging people to resolve disputes through negotiation, as opposed to 
litigation, . . . [communities] will strike deals that are good for themselves and bad for 
society as a whole”). 
 88 Sheikh, supra note 67, at 242. 
 89 See Gross, supra note 41, at 44 (stating a developer might argue that CBA 
commitments were made under pressure by elected officials and are invalid because 
they result from governmental action outside of the established approval process). 
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additional transaction costs a separate CBA process creates for 
developers.90  
Some of the most frequent criticisms of the CBA 
process, however, focus on community groups’ inability to 
adequately promote stakeholder interests during the CBA’s 
negotiation and implementation. These critiques include 
questions about whether the full range of interests are 
represented in negotiations;91 whether a representative of a 
particular interest group is truly representative, including 
whether they have properly managed diverse points of view;92 
and whether stakeholders have the capability to negotiate and 
monitor agreement implementation effectively.93 These 
concerns are amplified further by the fact that federal, state, or 
even municipal laws fail to mandate a particular negotiation 
framework or protocol, leaving each CBA negotiation subject to 
a separate organic process and rendering community groups 
unable to leverage lessons from prior negotiations. 
A number of commenters have argued that the absence 
of procedural mechanisms for ensuring effective and fair 
coalition composition has caused community interests to be 
represented too narrowly or in a biased manner. As an initial 
matter, some observers state that CBAs must be sufficiently 
inclusive of community interests to make the settlement 
meaningful.94 Indeed, because public support is a crucial 
bargaining chip, the range of stakeholders represented must be 
broad enough for the community coalition to be credible.95 
                                                
 90 See e.g., Been, supra note 34, at 30 (discussing the additional processes and 
transactional costs that CBAs require of developers, including establishing systems for 
transparency into developer activities not previously public). 
 91 Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 552. 
 92 Id. at 551-52 (“Another question is whether the groups that negotiated the 
CBA . . . should determine which groups should benefit.”); Been, supra note 34, at 24 
(discussing problems with managing the various community group interests in 
negotiating the terms of the Atlantic Yards CBA).  
 93 See, e.g., GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 23, 25 (recognizing potential legal 
costs and lack of experience with CBAs as impediments to community group 
participation in CBA negotiations); Beach, supra note 36, at 103 (discussing CBA 
enforcement and how “some groups may not have the capacity or desire to monitor 
compliance”); Fazio & Wallace, supra note 35, at 553 (“Another concern is whether the 
community parties have sufficient expertise to negotiate with developers for the 
CBA.”); Salkin & Levine, Understanding II, supra note 51, at 323 (footnote omitted) 
(“The costs of negotiating a CBA can be high. Organizing a coalition, holding meetings, 
conducting community research and preparing reports will all require funding. 
Coalitions that have no experience with CBAs, moreover, will likely need technical and 
legal assistance throughout the negotiation process. The funding required for all of this 
may inhibit the process.”). 
 94 Frank, supra note 65, at 252-53. 
 95 Id. (footnote omitted).  
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However, experienced developers may strategically undermine 
coalitions by identifying potential stakeholders not represented 
by the coalition.96 As a result, “CBAs with limited participation 
have met with equally limited success.”97 More importantly, 
when a coalition is too small, it risks excluding valuable voices 
from the community98 or allowing certain interests 
disproportionate power. For example, “In the Atlantic Yards 
project, one community group” that obtained benefits in 
exchange for the group’s public support “openly dismissed the 
complaints of other groups opposing the development.”99 
Additionally, in San Diego, a number of “local residents decried 
the heavy influence that labor unions played in the Ballpark 
Village CBA.”100  
On the other hand, an overly broad coalition 
precipitates different concerns. A very diverse coalition can be 
difficult to create, coordinate, and manage.101 Broad campaigns 
thus are more likely to result in a divergence of interests, 
making cooperation and unity difficult to achieve. In these 
situations, developers can more easily exploit factions by 
attempting to pare down community representation in the 
coalition to preserve the appearance of community involvement 
while excluding many key groups and issues from 
negotiations.102 These CBAs not only lose credibility but also 
raise significant concerns about the capacity of private CBAs 
alone to promote land use decisions that advance broader 
public interests. 
Various scholars have also detailed limitations in 
community stakeholders’ capacities to effectively negotiate 
CBAs, keep stakeholder representatives accountable, and 
monitor developer performance. First, the costs of negotiating a 
CBA may dissuade or impede stakeholder representatives.103 In 
addition, stakeholder representatives may be hindered by 
inexperience and lack resources to investigate project effects or 
determine the best terms for stakeholders, particularly as 
                                                
 96 Beach, supra note 36, at 100. 
 97 Frank, supra note 65, at 253. 
 98 Been, supra note 34, at 22. 
 99 Sheikh, supra note 67, at 236 (footnote omitted). 
 100 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 101 Frank, supra note 65, at 252-53. 
 102 See Been, supra note 34, at 24-25; Salkin & Lavine, Understanding I, 
supra note 39, at 30-31. 
 103 Musil, supra note 58, at 848 (stating CBA participants reported a range of 
concerns regarding cost and resource challenges of CBA negotiation); Salkin & Lavine, 
Understanding II, supra note 51, at 323. 
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compared to the greater sophistication of real estate developers 
in negotiating land use agreements.104 This limited capacity to 
assess what constitutes an appropriate agreement is 
exacerbated by the confidentiality of negotiations and terms of 
previously executed CBAs.105 Moreover, because CBAs may not 
be connected to the public regulatory process, stakeholders 
have no guaranteed forum where they can express their views 
about the CBA terms or procedure, and no formal way to hold 
negotiators accountable.106 Finally, monitoring the developer to 
ensure adequate performance presents practical, financial, and 
administrative challenges for stakeholders.107  
Some commenters have also pointed to uncertainties 
surrounding the legal enforceability of CBAs, given that courts 
have not yet examined their validity as private contracts and 
the absence of express statutory or regulatory authority for 
CBAs.108 Accordingly, some scholars question whether 
community groups provide sufficient consideration for the 
agreement to be enforceable, although most ultimately 
conclude that they do.109 Moreover, there are uncertainties 
regarding the extent to which community stakeholders have 
standing to sue to enforce the contract terms, particularly 
when they are not express parties to the agreement.110 Finally, 
some scholars question the extent to which CBAs, when 
integrated into the public land use process, would be subject to 
regulatory exactions limitations.111 Under the Fifth Amendment 
and analogous state constitutional takings limitations, any 
governmental conditions on project approvals must have a 
nexus to the project’s impacts and be roughly proportional to 
those impacts.112 This concern may come into sharpest relief 
                                                
 104 Been, supra note 34, at 24-25. 
 105 Id. at 25. 
 106 Id. at 21-22, 24. 
 107 Id. at 30. 
 108 Musil, supra note 58, at 838-39; Sheikh, supra note 67, at 233. 
 109 See, e.g., Salkin & Lavine, Understanding I, supra note 39, at 31. Salkin 
and Levine suggest promises to support or not to oppose development applications 
before public land use authorities may not be sufficient when compared to the 
extensive benefits and concessions offered by developers, particularly when the 
negotiating community group is not well-organized or broad and the developer’s need 
for community support is low. See id. However, the authors conclude that under 
general contract theory, “which does not generally inquire into the adequacy of 
consideration,” such promises can have substantial value for a developer are likely to 
be deemed supported by consideration. See id. 
 110 See id. at 32. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994) (holding that a local 
government must show that there is a rough proportionality between the exactions and 
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where a developer is required to sign a CBA as part of a public 
regulatory approval, government officials are closely involved 
in negotiations, or a CBA is reached proximate to a public 
approval.113  
III. THE PERSISTENT LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC BILATERAL 
NEGOTIATION 
Although there is some merit to commentators’ concerns 
over the increasing reliance on CBAs, these critiques are 
largely misplaced. CBAs have emerged as a fundamental 
consequence of the lack of stakeholder representation inherent 
in the now-prevalent bilateral-negotiation model. Yet CBAs 
largely function parallel to the public land use process rather 
than as a part of it. As currently utilized in land use decision 
making, these agreements can partially and occasionally 
address inadequacies of the bilateral model, but they certainly 
cannot abate them all. Rather, the critiques levied against 
CBAs are more appropriately understood as criticisms of the 
underlying bilateral model’s limitations. Furthermore, because 
CBAs have been treated as separate from the public land use 
process instead of as concerted attempts to renovate it, many of 
the problems with the bilateral model have been exacerbated 
by an increased reliance on CBAs. 
As explained above, the prevailing bilateral land use 
decision-making process provides extensive and unparalleled 
opportunities for negotiation by the developer while furnishing 
very limited participation for other affected parties. As a result, 
public land use controls are often criticized as being susceptible 
to corruption or disproportionate developer influence, 
unnecessarily adversarial, and ad hoc but unable to adapt to 
changed circumstances.114 Stakeholders turned to CBAs as a 
response to the limitations of conventional bilateral bargaining, 
  
 
the projected impact of the proposed development); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that to avoid an unconstitutional taking of private 
property, a “nexus” must exist between any imposed land use exaction and the effects 
of a proposed development). 
 113 Been, supra note 34, at 27-28. 
 114 See generally Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 42-62 (detailing the 
range of concerns about bilateral land use regulation); see also generally Selmi, supra 
note 48, at 611-42 (detailing concerns regarding the effects of the contract model of 
land use regulation on various governmental norms). 
374 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
as a way to better reflect the multiplicity of affected interests.115 
In this sense, they have proved useful in increasing 
stakeholders’ involvement in land use disputes. Many 
commenters—as well as some developers and municipalities—
have recognized the value of stakeholder involvement in 
increasing information, mitigating the likely negative effects 
from proposed development on other stakeholders, reducing 
long-term conflict, and helping promote an interactive civic 
life.116  
Despite these benefits, concerns persist about CBAs’ 
efficacy and legitimacy. Many critics of CBAs, however, seem to 
overlook the existing design of the broader regulatory 
framework and thus neglect the underlying problems of the 
prevailing bilateral model. The problems raised by these 
critiques stem more fundamentally from the bilateral model—
and the favored position of developers in the process—than 
from any inherent limitation of CBAs. For example, although 
private CBAs may enable land use decisions to reflect the 
broader range of affected interests, they fail to resolve the lack 
of transparency in the decision-making process as they are 
currently used. Indeed, CBAs still allow key moments in the 
process to remain private, keeping them opaque and hidden 
from public view. In that sense, the emergence of private CBAs 
has further reduced transparency, removing important 
decisions from public examination. Nevertheless, this opacity 
more fundamentally originated from the prevailing bilateral 
land use process’s limited opportunities for participation and 
its vulnerability to unfair dealing, not from CBAs themselves. 
Perhaps the most problematic features of CBAs, 
however, stem from their use of parallel private negotiations to 
supplement or circumvent the public land use process in lieu of 
any concerted attempt to improve public governance. Although 
the integration of private and public processes is not 
problematic per se,117 CBAs undoubtedly have an uneasy and 
unclear relationship with public land use decision making as 
they are currently used. And this vagueness is troublesome. 
CBAs are not wholly private, as they obligate stakeholders to 
support or acquiesce in development applications that are 
                                                
 115 Cf. Been, supra note 34, at 15 (discussing how supporters of CBAs argue 
that standard public “land use procedures often fail to ensure that the concerns of the 
neighborhood most affected by the proposed development are considered and 
adequately addressed”). 
 116 See supra notes 48-77 and accompanying text. 
 117 See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text. 
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before public decision makers. Yet they are not public 
agreements either, as they are typically negotiated without the 
involvement of public authorities and entered into only by 
private parties. Treating CBAs as both supplemental and 
distinct from the public land use process creates a new category 
of agreement that introduces various legal uncertainties, 
including their questionable validity, enforceability, and 
relationship to regulatory exactions.118 Of course, introducing a 
parallel private process alongside the existing public one also 
leads to foreseeable inefficiencies and increased costs for both 
developers and other community members.119  
Furthermore, by failing to incorporate CBAs’ 
stakeholder participation mechanisms into the public process, 
the use of CBAs remains largely elective. CBAs may provide 
community stakeholders with opportunities for additional 
input on local community land use decisions, but only when the 
developer so chooses. In virtually every jurisdiction in the 
United States, the developer decides the fundamental 
questions in the CBA process. These questions include whether 
the CBA process will be used at all; which stakeholders may 
negotiate; the framework and extent of the negotiation, 
including the timing, amount, and types of participation by 
interested stakeholders; and the relationship between the CBA 
negotiation process and the public regulatory process.120 As with 
the more conventional bilateral process, this framework is 
likely to systematically overvalue developers’ interest in 
relation to other stakeholders.121 Accordingly, although CBAs 
may provide other stakeholders with additional opportunities 
to exert influence, they arguably make the developer an even 
greater focus of that process.  
A corollary to all of this, of course, is that local 
government planners become less important to the mediation 
of multilateral land use conflicts. While the standard bilateral 
public-negotiation process places government planning officials 
in the difficult position of negotiating for many competing and 
subjective interests with only limited participatory input,122 the 
private CBA process detaches the local government planner—
with all her skills for information generation and capacity 
                                                
 118 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. 
 119 See GROSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 23. 
 120 See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text. 
 121 Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 283. 
 122 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 50. 
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building—from such decision making. Indeed, the critique of 
CBAs as presenting a suite of stakeholder representation 
problems is persuasive precisely because the local 
governmental authority has been divested of any responsibility 
or involvement in community organization, information 
gathering and dissemination, and capacity building.123  
In sum, CBAs may provide a range of participatory 
benefits. Because they are ad hoc and elective patches to the 
public regulatory process, however, they alone cannot fix a 
regulatory system that often leads to inefficient, unfair, and 
undemocratic decisions. In fact, their reliance on the developer 
as the key actor may further erode the public decision-making 
process. Moreover, CBAs’ current lack of transparency and 
uncertain relationship with public regulation may further 
divide rather than bridge the considerable accountability and 
legitimacy gap that exists in public land use governance.  
IV. INTEGRATING STAKEHOLDERS THROUGH COLLABORATIVE 
GOVERNANCE 
One of the primary criticisms of CBAs is that they blur 
the lines between public and private land use processes.124 
However, integrating and relying on private parties in public 
processes is not illegitimate simply because it might complicate 
understandings of the relationship between private parties and 
public governance. Any such critique would rely on an 
antiquated understanding of governance that expects a strict 
divide between public and private spheres and envisions a very 
limited private role in public processes.125  
Indeed, such a critique vitally disregards how the 
prevailing bilateral process already blurs the line between 
public and private roles in land use decision making—at least 
for developers. The departure from a unilateral model of public 
land use regulation was largely due to recognition that public 
planners were unable to divine the public interest through 
objective expertise.126 Yet in its place, regulatory processes have 
increasingly been designed to grant certain private parties—
                                                
 123 Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 287. 
 124 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
 125 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543, 558 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman II] (describing the New Deal Era theory of 
administrative law which viewed the role of the government separate and insulated 
from private interest). 
 126 Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12, at 5. 
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namely developers—considerable advantages over others in the 
bargaining process.127 Although the bilateral model correctly 
rejects the formalist distinctions between public and private 
embodied in the unilateral model of zoning, it has legitimacy 
problems of its own. In particular, the bilateral model grants 
developers considerable access to revise the rules applicable to 
their property, while permitting limited public input. By doing 
so, the bilateral model marginalizes other stakeholders, leading 
to poorly informed and unfair decisions that often fail to 
adequately reflect the interests of all affected parties.128 
As many scholars have argued, private parties are not 
antithetical to public processes. In fact, active private 
participation is critical to successful governance.129 Professor 
Jody Freeman130 and other leading scholars131 have persuasively 
challenged the formal public–private distinction in regulation, 
proposing an alternative conception of governance as a set of 
negotiated relationships between public and private actors.132 
What is vital is that regulatory processes are designed to 
effectively and fairly harness private resources to promote 
public ends.133 Unfortunately, the existing bilateral model—
notwithstanding the elective and sporadic complement of 
CBAs—fails to consistently integrate the full range of affected 
stakeholders into the governance process in an effective or 
equitable manner.  
Because of the questionable legitimacy of CBAs, some 
commenters have recommended that local governments refrain 
from using them.134 Alternatively, some have argued that if 
CBAs are used, they should be shielded from the public land 
use process through the prohibition of government involvement 
                                                
 127 Id. at 30-33. 
 128 See generally Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 12. 
 129 See generally Freeman II, supra note 125 (describing activities 
traditionally associated with government that depend heavily on private participation). 
 130 See generally Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New 
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman III]; Jody 
Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2001) [hereinafter 
Freeman IV]. 
 131 See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented 
Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 769, 802 (1998) (discussing role of globalization in creating new forms of 
blended public and private power); Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer’s Response to 
Privatisation and Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 52 (Michael 
Taggart ed., 1997) (discussing roles of public and private actors in what he calls 
“mixed” administrations). 
 132 See generally Freeman III, supra note 130. 
 133 Id. at 824. 
 134 Been, supra note 34, at 31. 
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in their negotiation, implementation, or enforcement.135 Rather 
than isolating stakeholders and public authorities from each 
other, or using CBAs as a selective, ad hoc supplement to the 
existing bilateral framework, states should integrate lessons 
from the more collaborative CBAs into the governance process. 
As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, states should 
require municipalities to integrate mechanisms for stakeholder 
participation and negotiation more fully into the process.136 
Additional opportunities to participate in governance should be 
included at all phases of the regulatory process, from initial 
city-wide planning through development construction and 
operation.137 This could mean giving affected stakeholders direct 
responsibility for implementing or monitoring elements of the 
regulatory regime that implicate their interests.138 Instead of 
prohibiting or limiting the terms of CBAs, the law should 
induce local governments to look for opportunities to harness 
private parties to promote public ends.139 
By adjusting the public regulatory process to require the 
integration of more effective participation opportunities for 
stakeholders, states can stimulate democratic participation, 
minimize the costs associated with relying on separate public and 
private negotiations, and promote decisions that better reflect 
the interests of all affected parties.140 Integrating private parties 
would also alleviate the concerns about opacity and enforceability 
that currently plague the bilateral public process and CBAs. 
Additionally, this multilateral model would have the ancillary 
effect of limiting the need for private agreements altogether.141  
A realistic and appropriate avenue for the expansion of 
meaningful participation opportunities lies in existing 
statewide enabling acts that authorize local governments to 
enter into development agreements and/or annexation 
agreements.142 Because they are increasingly used for large-
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 136 Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 280-81. 
 137 Id. 
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 140 Cf. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 76, at 307-14 (discussing the 
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scale development and allow developers and local governments 
unparalleled flexibility to shape the substantive terms and 
conditions of development, development agreements and 
annexation agreements provide the ideal experimental 
opportunity to reshape the process to be more participatory and 
collaborative. Indeed, because these agreements are voluntary 
contracts that provide a developer valuable vested development 
rights, most authorities agree that they are not subject to 
constitutional exaction limits.143 However, since development 
agreements provide few substantive standards to restrict the 
scope of negotiations, they prompt concerns of unfair dealing and 
increase the need for heightened participation requirements.144  
These enabling statutes could be amended to require 
development agreements and annexation agreements to be 
negotiated openly and publicly, giving affected stakeholders a 
voice in negotiations that would compare to the voice they 
enjoy in both private and public CBAs. Another possibility is 
for the incorporation of community benefits provisions into the 
development agreement, which is already done for some CBAs. 
Indeed, some commenters promote this practice as a way to 
improve enforceability.145 Environmental impact assessment 
processes, such as those required under the National 
Environmental Policy Act146 and state analogs such as the 
California Environmental Quality Act147 or New York State 
Environmental Quality Review Act,148 could also be leveraged to 
adjust the regulatory process and promote more valuable 
stakeholder involvement in considering the scope of project 
features, analyzing potential effects, and assessing alternatives. 
                                                
 143 See, e.g., Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coal. v. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 447, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]t is likely that the City would have 
demanded additional consideration from [the developer] for . . . a separate development 
agreement.”); Save the Sunset Strip Coal. v. City of W. Hollywood, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
172, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court conclusion that development 
agreement cash payment of $5.2 million does not constitute an illegal sale of city’s 
police power and that city need not “identify some particular cost attributable to the 
development to justify such a fee”); City of Colo. Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 392 
P.2d 467, 472 (Colo. 1964) (holding that a city may impose conditions in annexation 
agreement because the city action is “purely contractual”); see also generally Camacho, 
Mustering I, supra note 12, at 30-32; Development Agreements, 2 ZONING AND LAND 
USE CONTROLS (MB) ch. 9A, at 9A-.04 to -.05 (2012). 
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Congruent with modern planning and regulatory theory, these 
agreements should be adaptive. For example, they should 
include concrete triggers that mandate sustained monitoring 
and assessment of compliance, with procedures that permit 
periodic adjustments to uncertain conditions in order to account 
for new information and changed conditions.149  
Once adopted, development agreements would remain 
enforceable only by the developer and local government; 
however, affected stakeholders could be assigned key monitoring 
roles during the implementation and enforcement stages with 
respect to the benefits or development impacts that will affect 
them most directly.150 This approach would empower motivated 
private parties to promote developer accountability and 
therefore advance public enforcement goals.151 Equally 
significant, incorporating a more multilateral model during each 
phase of the development’s evolution through the development 
agreement provides a vehicle for fostering and managing an 
ongoing relationship between the members of a community.152  
In addition, providing more meaningful opportunities 
for stakeholder participation reorients the local government 
planner to a more effective mediation role. No longer would the 
government planner be expected to serve as a negotiator on 
behalf of the public interest as she is under the conventional 
bilateral model, where the planner is disconnected from 
community stakeholders and presumed omniscient about their 
needs.153 Nor would the planner be excluded from negotiations, 
as is typically the case under the private CBA process. Instead, 
the local government representative would help identify 
interested stakeholders and inform interested parties about the 
potential benefits and effects of proposed development, without 
negotiating on their behalf.154  
This role as a facilitator, community organizer, and 
gatherer and distributor of information draws on a key aspect 
of contemporary planning theory and reflects a professional 
orientation that planners are increasingly being trained to 
embrace.155 Initially, the local government’s function would be 
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to facilitate a scoping process to determine the degree of 
participation in the negotiations that would best serve the 
interests of the full range of possible stakeholders.156 Then, if 
appropriate, the planning official would provide resources and 
facilitate negotiations, rather than being placed in the 
impossible role of mandating the public interest (under the 
unilateral model) or serving as the sole negotiator on behalf of 
many diverse interests (under the bilateral model). Such a 
community scoping process would resemble a common 
community-organizing process used in CBAs, where local groups 
explore the goals and resource capacity of stakeholders.157 
Crucially, however, local government officials would facilitate 
and mediate discussions on the range of stakeholder-
representation issues. If developers or other stakeholders are 
unwilling or unable to negotiate, the municipality could 
negotiate with such parties separately in order to gather 
information about potential effects and alternatives, assess 
interests, develop terms and conditions, formulate development 
plans, and potentially execute agreements.158  
Though of course the efficacy of a multilateral approach 
is inevitably context-specific, studies in dispute resolution 
suggest that multilateral approaches to public policy dispute 
resolution tend to be more effective in circumstances in which 
disputes are more concrete, involve a manageable number (and 
fewer diffuse) stakeholders, and agreement implementation 
largely depends on the participants and groups they 
represent.159 In such circumstances, participation is more likely 
to be less costly and more convenient, stakeholders tend to 
have powerful incentives to resolve disputes because 
relationships are more likely to be long term, and agreements 
will tend to be easier to enforce and implement. Unlike 
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prominent federal multilateral processes such as most 
negotiated rulemakings, the disputes in local land use conflicts 
tend to have these characteristics.160 Although American land 
use regulatory processes remain understudied, modest 
evidence suggests that using a more multilateral orientation to 
resolve land use disputes can reduce costs, lead to processes 
that are more widely accepted, and produce agreements that 
are favored over those reached under the conventional bilateral 
approach. According to “[t]he only broad[ly] published study of 
the burgeoning use of collaborative land use agreements to 
date—a study that examined land use mediation processes—
. . . ninety-one percent of participants, including government 
officials, reported that the process cost less . . . than more 
adversarial, conventional alternatives.”161 Additionally, “eighty-
five percent [of participants reported] that the process took less 
time . . . .”162 Perhaps most importantly, however, the vast 
majority of participants were satisfied with their mediated 
collaborative process and preferred the negotiated outcome to 
the standard decision-making process.163 Even where the 
collaborative process did not result in a final agreement, almost 
two-thirds of participants who viewed their dispute as 
unresolved thought that the mediated multilateral process 
helped the parties make significant progress.164 
CONCLUSION 
Integrating a more multilateral and adaptive model into 
the development and agreement process promotes the 
legitimacy of public land use governance. Indeed, this model 
addresses the biggest critiques of the conventional bilateral 
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approach. Integrating CBAs into development-agreement and 
annexation-agreement frameworks would minimize the costs 
from the redundancy of multiple parallel processes, and it 
would enable local authorities to promote agreements that 
better reflect the full range of affected parties. The multilateral 
model also places the government in the more appropriate and 
effective role of managing and facilitating stakeholder 
representation, which nurtures a more engaged civic culture by 
incentivizing participation within affected communities.165 By 
enabling affected parties to participate directly in and shape 
the democratic process, the multilateral model engages and 
helps cultivate a local government’s most distinctive and 
essential source of legitimacy.166  
There undoubtedly are challenges with a reliance on a 
more multilateral model as the basis for land use decision 
making. These include the difficulties of promoting effective 
stakeholder representation, minimizing the potential 
unwieldiness of a multilateral process, and overcoming self-
interested behavior by local interests.167 Nonetheless, one of the 
key advantages of a multilateral regulatory design is that it can 
make addressing these concerns regarding the relationship 
among stakeholders, and between stakeholders and regulators, 
the focus of governance.168 Ultimately, by empowering and 
encouraging community participation, a multilateral model 
would more likely produce agreements that are fairer, more 
effective, and broadly accepted. It also would provide a process 
that is more congruent with modern planning and governance 
theory than either the initial unilateral model or conventional 
bilateral model, even as supplemented by CBAs.169 
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